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Controlling Chemicals Used To Make Illegal 
Drugs: The Chemical Action Task Force and 
the Domestic Chemical Action Group 
The criminal justice system has become 
extremely sophisticated in its efforts to 
prevent and control drug trafficking. The 
method most visible to the public, and most 
often covered by the news media, is the 
seizure of illicit drugs such as cocaine and 
heroin. The Office of National Drug Con-
trol Policy (ONDCP) reported that in 1990 
alone, 215,000 pounds of cocaine-with a 
·treet value of $3 billion-were seized by 
.1e Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, and the U.S. Border Patrol. 1 
The seizure of illicit drugs, however, is 
only one aspect of our national drug control 
strategy. Illicit drugs are the basis of an 
illegal, deadly, and worldwide "industry." 
Law enforcement agencies around the 
world are attacking this industry not only 
by interdiction of the drugs themselves, but 
also through such methods as disrupting 
From the Director 
Chemicals diverted from legitimate com-
merce are used in the production of illicit 
drugs such as cocaine, heroin, methamphet-
amine, PCP, and LSD. In fact, most ofthe 
cocaine smuggled into the United States is 
processed with chemicals exported by 
American and Western European compa-
nies, and nearly all methamphetamine, 
LSD, and PCP are illegally manufactured 
using chemicals from domestic and foreign 
suppliers. Controlling the illegal diversion 
and use of such chemicals is essential to 
limiting the production of illicit drugs. 
The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking 
Act of 1988 has already proven effective in 
money laundering operations, breaking up 
drug distribution networks, and destroying 
crops. 
Another part of this many-faceted attack 
on drug trafficking is the control of precur-
sor and essential chemicals, which are 
necessary to produce cocaine and heroin, 
as well as LSD, PCP, and methamphet-
amine. In fact, during the last 2 years, the 
Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (the 
G-7), in cooperation with other countries 
where precursor and essential chemicals 
are prqduced, imported, or consumed, has 
launched a concerted effort to control these 
chemicals. 
The United States is among the world's 
leading producers of precursor and essen-
tial chemicals. And most Americans don't 
realize that until 1989 much of the cocaine 
entering our country was produced using 
limiting the illicit international diversion of 
so-called precursor chemicals. Just as money 
laundering can be traced through financial 
records, so can illicit drug production be traced 
through the records of manufacturers and 
dealers of raw materials used in drug produc-
tion. The act has helped extend the awareness 
of law enforcement agencies about the role of 
essential and precursor chemicals in the illicit 
drug trade. 
This Research in Brief discusses what has been 
done to curtail the diversion of chemicals for 
illicit drug production within the United States 
and outlines American involvement in 
strengthening international controls on the 
diversion of precursor and essential chemicals. 
This Brief also discusses a new problem con-
essential chemicals manufactured in the 
United States. This Research in Brief dis-
cusses what has been done to radically 
curtail the diversion of chemicals for illicit 
drug production within our own borders. It 
also highlights U.S. invo lvement in inter-
national efforts to stren then ·ontrols on 
the illicit diversion of pr~cursor and essen-
tial chemicals. 
The role of chemicals in 
illegal drug production 
What are precursor and essential chemi-
cals? All major illicit drugs except mari-
juana are either extracted or synthesized in 
a process requiring chemicals. Some drugs 
are extracted from plants. Cocaine, for 
example, is extracted from the coca leaf. 
Since cocaine already exists in the leaves 
of the coca plant, no precursors are 
fronting police and prosecutors across the 
Nation : the control and disposition of 
clandestine drug laboratories, which are 
inexpensive to establish, easy to conceal, 
and highly profitable. 
Much of the information in this Briefwas 
first gathered by the international Chemical 
Action Task Force and the Domestic 
Chemical Action Group. The National 
Institute of Justice is pleased to have sup-
ported the activities of these groups, as 
well as to. have distributed information on 
their proceedings to the law enforcement 
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involved in its production. Chemicals used 
in the cocaine extraction process do not 
become part of the cocaine molecule, but 
because they are crucial to its manufacture, 
they are categorized as essential chemicals. 
Other drugs, like LSD and PCP, are sub-
stances that do not occur in nature and, 
therefore, are synthesized in a clandestine 
laboratory from precursor chemicals, 
which do become part of the drug's 
molecular structure. 
Synthetic drugs such as amphetamines and 
many hallucinogens can be produced in 
large or small laboratories. Cocaine, on the 
other hand, is present in the leaves of the 
coca plant in very small concentrations. 
Therefore, large amounts of leaves and 
solvents are required for the extraction 
process. The coca leaves are wet with 
water, and a base such as lime is added. 
Kerosene or some other organic solvent is 
then used to extract the cocaine from the 
macerated coca leaves. A dilute aqueous 
solution of an acid such as sulfuric acid 
separates the cocaine from the kerosene; 
ammonia water precipitates the cocaine, 
which is dried as coca paste. The coca 
paste is purified with an oxidizing agent 
such as potassium permanganate and addi-
tional processing. An acid such as hydro-
chloric acid produces the final product, 
cocaine hydrochloride. 
Synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine 
are made by chemical processes involving 
precursor as well as essential chemicals. 
Precursors to methamphetamine include 
such substances as phenyl-2-propanone 
(P2P) or ephedrine. In the synthesis, the 
precursor is incorporated as part of the 
methamphetamine molecule. Essential 
chemicals such as solvents and compounds 
are used to adjust the reaction conditions. 
The chemical diversion 
operation 
Why should State and local law enforce-
ment officials concern themselves about 
essential and precursor chemicals? If they 
could be kept out of the hands of illicit 
drug manufacturers, these chemicals could 
not be used to produce such drugs. If law 
enforcement agencies can follow the trail 
of precursor and essential chemicals from 
the chemical manufacturer to the illicit 
user, the illicit drug producers could be 
identified and apprehended. Thus, the 
control of precursors and essentials is a 
potent strategy that, along with interdic-
tion, intelligence, and financial investiga-
tion, can help identify drug criminals and 
interfere with their operations. 
International diversion of essential 
chemicals. ONDCP has estimated that the 
world supply of cocaine in 1990 was I ,000 
metric tons, or about 2.2 million pounds. 
To produce this amount of cocaine, mil-
lions of pounds of essential chemicals were 
required for processing. Yet, it is not easy 
to identify essential chemicals that are 
bound for illicit uses. Many essential 
chemicals such as hydrochloric acid, ether, 
and acetone also have hundreds of legiti-
mate uses. They are produced in the 
United States by the thousands of tons, and 
many thousands of businesses use them 
daily. 
Since most essential chemicals have a 
wide variety of uses, they are common 
substances in international trade. Thou-
sands of tons are shipped annually to 
foreign ports for industrial purposes. 
Ironically, while cocaine destined for the 
United States often has come from Latin 
America, prior to 1988, many of the essen-
tial chemicals used in its production were 
manufactured here at home. 
In 1988, the United States exported some 
90,000 metric tons of essential chemicals 
to Latin America. Over 80 percent of the 
methyl ethyl ketone, 90 percent of the 
acetone, and 70 percent of the potassium 
permanganate imported into Latin America 
that year originated in the United States.2 
However, the Chemical Diversion and 
Trafficking Act of 1988, described below, 
has greatly decreased U.S. exports of these 
substances to Latin America. 
Essential chemicals reach the drug produc-
ers in a variety of ways. (Exhibit 1 illus-
trates how these chemicals can be diverted 
to illegal use.) Criminals may obtain these 
substances from manufacturers through 
theft, bribery of employees, or even legal 
purchase, especially in areas that lack 
chemical control laws or do not enforce 
such laws. Tracing the diversion of these 
substances is difficult because of poor 
production and shipping records and poor 
identification of customers. Of course, 
poor plant security can always result in 
theft. Retailers and wholesalers of the 
chemicals can make direct cash sales to 
drug manufacturers; sometimes the retail-
ers themselves are "front companies" set 
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up to disguise illicit drug trade. However / 
it should be noted that the majority of ' 
chemical manufacturers and dealers refuse 
to participate in these illegal and substand-
ard industry practices. 
The vast international network of freight 
forwarders, brokers, and agents can afford 
criminals access to these chemicals 
through multiple sales transactions, similar 
to money laundering operations. Multiple 
changes in ownership of the product as it 
goes from port to port also can be decep-
tive and confusing for customs officials, 
thus permitting diversion for illicit use. Of 
course, overseas shipments also are subject 
to theft because of the lack of physical 
control. 
In ports and free trade zones, criminals can 
obtain essential and precursor chemicals 
through such subterfuges as repacking or 
relabeling of materials. 
Finally, drug producers can conserve their 
stocks of essential chemicals by recycling 
them or recovering them from the disposal 
processes of legitimate sources. 
As controls over the manufacturing and 
distribution processes improve worldwid< 
the illicit drug manufacturers still may 
have several options by which to continue 
drug production. The chemicals used in 
drug production can be substituted with 
other, nonlisted materials that have similar 
chemical properties. Also, criminals can 
buy the chemical raw materials and make 
the precursor and essential substances 
themselves. Front companies may make 
and sell these chemicals legally, while 
"backroom operations" concoct the illegal 
substances. "Smurfing"-buying quanti-
ties of each substance just under the level 
at which reporting is required-is also how 
criminals commonly obtain materials. 
However, these options greatly add to the 
criminals ' costs, and proper regulation and 
recordkeeping requirements make it in-
creasingly likely that even these diversion 
methods will result in detection of illicit 
operations. 
Domestic clandestine labs and precursor 
chemicals. Although the processing of the 
coca leaf to make cocaine, for example, 
requires a large-scale operation, many 
synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine 
and PCP can be produced in someone's 
home (although venting of fumes is a 
problem) with readily available laboratory 
equipment. In fact, a criminal using 
Exhibit 1. Diversion of Precursor Chemicals 
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equipment and precursor chemicals worth 
$200 can in 18 hours produce a batch of 
methamphetamine with a street value of 
$98,000.3 
The problem of clandestine labs increased 
at an alarming rate throughout the 1980's. 
It peaked in 1989 with the implementation 
of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking 
Act, which dramatically reversed this 
trend. While police seized 226 clandestine 
labs in 1983, by 1989 this number had 
increased to 807--Dr well over 2 per day.4 
However, the-number of clandestine lab 
seizures decreased by 35 percent to 521 in 
1990 and by 28 percent in 1991 to 375. 
The greater difficulty criminals had in 
obtaining precursor chemicals was clearly 
a major factor in the decline in seizures. 
These seizures pose special problems for 
law enforcement officers. Many of the 
chemicals used in drug manufacturing are 
dangerous. Acids and solvents are corro-
sive and flammable; some are highly ex-
plosive. About one-fifth of clandestine lab 
seizures result from reports of fires caused 
by the chemical processes. According to a 
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study in Califomia,5 one-tenth of seized 
labs have been boobytrapped with explo-
sives, or worse, with disfiguring and poi-
sonous chemical devices. Also, the 
corrosive nature of many precursor and 
essential chemicals can cause lung and eye 
damage, even upon exposure to vapors 
emanating from the lab. 
At present, much clandestine lab activity 
is occurring in the west coast States of 
California, Oregon, and Washington. 
However, as law enforcement officials in 
these States have increased their efforts 
against clandestine labs, the phenomenon 
has spread across the country. Texas also 
had a major clandestine lab problem, but 
increased enforcement resulted in the relo-
cation of these labs to neighboring States 
like Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas.fi 
However, Oklahoma recently has reported 
a dramatic decline in clandestine lab activ-
ity, attributable to enforcement of a strict 
State chemical control law. 
The problem is not just one for urban juris-
dictions. In fact, illegal drug manufacturers 
often set up labs in rural areas where strong 
fumes, suspicious bottles, and drums of 
chemicals are less likely to be detected. 
Highway patrols often get involved in lab 
seizures because some criminals keep the 
labs in trucks or mobile homes which can 
be moved frequently to escape detection. 
The diversion of precursor chemicals for 
use in clandestine labs is similar to the 
diversion of essential chemicals described 
earlier. As with essential chemicals, many 
precursors have legitimate applications 
in medicine, manufacturing, and other 
industries. 
Anti-diversion legislation 
The principal U.S. statute to control the 
diversion of precursor and essential chemi-
cals is the Chemical Diversion and Traf-
ficking Act, Subtitle A of the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Amendments of 1988 (Title VI, 
Public Law 100--670), which amended the 
Controlled Substances Act and the Con-
trolled Substances Import and Export Act 
(21 U.S.C. 802 et seq.) The Chemical Di-
version and Trafficking Act established 
recordkeeping requirements and enforce-
ment activities for precursor and essential 
chemicals. It originally listed 12 precursor 
chemicals and 8 essential chemicals that 
must be controlled to prevent their use in 
illegal drug production; machines for 
tableting or encapsulating drugs are also 
controlled. State and Federal laws make the 
unauthorized trade in these substances 
equivalent to trafficking in the actual illegal 
drugs. In November 1990, 12 new chemi-
cals were added to the list, and I was de-
leted. (Additional amendments to the 
Federal Chemical Diversion and Traffick-
ing Act were proposed, but were not passed 
by Congress.) 
The Federal anti-diversion act has three 
basic requirements for all manufacturers 
and distributors: 
e To keep retrievable records of the distri-
bution, receipt, sale, importation, or expor-
tation of any of the chemicals or machines 
on the list (there are threshold limits for 
each chemical, below which records need 
not be kept). 
e To report certain unusual or suspicious 
orders for these substances to the DEA. 
e To obtain proof of identity for custom-
ers, whether individuals or companies. 
The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking 
Act gives the DEA authority to stop the 
import or export of precursor and essential 
chemicals if their use cannot be shown to 
have legitimate medical, scientific, or com-
mercial purposes. As the lead Federal 
agency for combating the manufacture and 
distribution of illegal drugs, the DEA also 
is responsible for preventing the diversion 
of licitly produced drugs and chemicals. 
All imports or exports of precursors and 
essentials over the threshold limit must be 
reported to the DEA through an Import/ 
Export Declaration (DEA Form 486), and 
shipments of all listed chemicals through 
the United States must be reported to the 
DEA at least IS days before the shipment. 
The DEA has 19 regional offices across 
the country with which manufacturers and 
distributors of listed chemicals must file 
reports under certain defined circum-
stances. The DEA also has the power to 
suspend shipments of chemicals when the 
agency has evidence that the shipment may 
be diverted for illicit purposes. 
A total of 24 precursor and 7 essential 
chemicals are now on the list. Failure to 
comply with the more technical require-
ments of the law can result in up to I year 
in prison and a civil penalty of up to 
$25,000 per violation. For distributing one 
of these substances knowing that it will be 
used for illicit purposes, the penalty is up 
to I 0 years in prison and a fine of up to 
$250,000 for individuals; up to $500,000 
for corporations. [See 21 U.S.C. 841 (d) 
(2); 18 u.s.c. 3571.] 
These regulations already have been suc-
cessful in controlling the export of essen-
tial chemicals to Latin American cocaine 
factories. In 1988, 55 percent of the im-
ports of essential chemicals to Colombia 
originated in the United States. In 1989, 
this amount had decreased to 33 percent of 
imports. Overall, the export of essential 
chemicals to Latin America from the 
United States dropped from 133 metric 
tons in 1984 to 40 metric tons in 1989. 
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Multinational Task Force 
Formed To Halt Diversion 
of Chemicals 
The intemutional Chemical Action 
Task Force ( A TF> Willi formed to 
pre ent the divel'!iion of chemicals 
from legitimate commerce to the 
nuu1ufacturc of illicit drugs. CATF 
members included the Group of 
Seven lndustriali7.ed Nation. , known 
ns the G-7 (Canuda, Fmnce. Italy. 
Oennany, Japan. the United King-
dom. United Stales., nnd the Europeun 
Community), 3s well UJ Argentina. 
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia. Bntzil, 
Chile. Colombia. Ecuador. Hungary, 
India, the ethcrlands. Pakistan, Peru. 
pain, whzerland. and Thailand. The 
Organi7.ation of American States and 
the Jntemational Narcotics Control 
Soard nlso participated. 
The 0-7 wn fil'!it tonned during the 
Ford administmtion . o that the major 
industrial powers could discuss joint 
policy approaches toward critical 
world economic problems. 
In addition to Federal legislation, 18 States 
have enacted their own laws on the control 
of these substances. There are, of course, 
some variations among those State laws in 
terms of the chemicals controlled and the 
method of regulation and recordkeeping. 
To foster uniformity among States, the 
National Institute of Justice, iri coordina-
tion with the DEA and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice's Criminal Division, 
launched an initiative with the American 
Prosecutors Research Institute (an affiliate 
of the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion) to draft a model State statute for 
the control of precursor and essential 
chemicals. 
The Chemical Action Task Force 
Of course, the decrease in exports of these 
chemicals from the United States would be 
meaningless if other chemical-producing 
nations did not cooperate. Unfortunately, 
the effectiveness of the U.S. Chemical 
Diversion and Trafficking Act has been 
limited because other chemical-producing 
countries began to take up the slack in 
supplying South American countries with 
:ssential chemicals. The United Nations 
.tddressed this important problem in Ar-
ticle 12 of the U.N. Convention Against 
lllicil Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances, signed in Vienna in 
1988 by more than 80 nations. This con-
vention initially applied only to the 12 
chemicals, but the United Nations Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs recently recom-
mended to the U.N. Secretary General that 
I 0 chemicals be added. This addition is 
expected to be effective in the autumn or 
1992. The convention imposed some re-
quirements on countries to regulate the 
international commerce in chemicals. The 
United Nations also identified some regu-
latory measures that countries could take to 
control diversion within their borders. 
Although the 1988 U.N. convention was a 
first step toward the control of these 
chemicals in intemational trade, countries 
must do more to control diversion. Recog-
nizing this, the G-7, at its economic sum-
mit meeting in Houston in July 1990, 
called for the establishment of a multi-
national Chemical Action Task Force 
(CATF). At the Houston meeting, Presi-
dent George Bush and the prime ministers 
md other govemment officials from the 
G-7 members recognized the importance 
of curbing the illegal diversion and use of 
precursor and essential chemicals. The G-
7 participants directed that the CATF make 
recommendations to prevent the diversion 
of these substances from legitimate com-
merce to the manufacture of illicit drugs. 
The U.S. Government organized the CATF 
in 1990, and the U.S. Depmtment of Jus-
tice chaired the task force, which met six 
times in Washington, D.C., between Octo-
ber 1990 and May 1992. During its first 
year, the chainnan of the international 
group was William P. Barr, then the 
Deputy Attorney General, and currently 
the Attorney General of the United States; 
Deputy Attomey General George J. 
Terwilliger III assumed the chairmanship 
in the spring of 1992. 
The Domestic Chemical 
Action Group 
The Department of Justice sought to 
ensure that its delegates to the CATF 
remained infonned about the views and 
:oncerns of State and local officials on this 
issue so they could accurately portray the 
status of U.S . law enforcement efforts. For 
this purpose, the National Institute of Jus-
Domestic Chemical Action 
Group Members 
The National Institute of Justice con-
vened a Domestic Chemical Action 
Group (DCAG) to asse!.s U.S. law 
enforcement efforts to prevent illicit 
use of chemic<Jls and accurately por-
tray those efforts to the Chemical 
Action Task Force. The DC AG in-
cluded leading experts on issues re-
lated to the diversion of chemicals and 
clmu1estine dn1g labs. Members 
included: 
Association representath·es 
National Fraternal Order of Police 
National Criminal Justice 
Association 
International Association of 
Chiefs of Police 
National Association of Attorneys 
General 
U.S. Conference of Mayors 
Chemical Manufacturers 
Association 
National District Attomeys 
Association 
tice invited approximately 30 experts in the 
area of chemical diversion from all over 
the country to fom1 a Domestic Chemical 
Action Group (DCAG). 
The DCAG met in late October 1990 to 
discuss the status of regulation of these 
chemicals and to develop info1mation for 
use in the CATF. These expe11s discussed 
existing national controls on the diversion 
of precursor and essential chemicals. In 
comparison with other countries, the 
United States is very sophisticated in these 
efforts. Nevertheless, many problems 
remain, and the DCAG identified a num-
ber of issues and made suggestions for 
addressing some of them. These include: 
Training. Every component of the law 
enforcement system requires training and 
information on diversion. Judges and pros-
ecutors may not recognize the seriousness 
of the charges of diverting these substances 
and may treat them more lightly than stan-
dard drug possession or distribution cases. 
Also, prosecutors and police sometimes 
are not fully aware of appropriate methods 
for investigating and bringing to trial cases 
involving diversion. Such cases resemble 
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States represented by practitioners 
Washington 
California 
Pennsylvania 
Texas 
Colorado 
Components of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
Criminal Division 
Office of Justice Programs. 
including the National Institute of 
Justice 
Attorney General Ken Eikenberry of 
Washington State, and Michael Scott, 
Commander of the Narcotics Service 
of the Texas Department of Public 
Safety. were named spokespersons for 
the group and joined the U.S. delega-
tion at the 1990 and 1991 Chemical 
Action Task Force meetings. 
while-collar crimes and money laundering 
because investigation often entails finding 
and following complex trai Is of paper 
records. 
Police are in particular need of training 
because of the dangers involved in search-
ing for and seizing clandestine labs. The 
danger of explosions, as well as of burns 
and lung damage from caustic chemicals, 
requires special training in handling these 
substances. Officers also must be made 
more aware of ways to prevent the illegal 
movement of these substances on high-
ways and by other means of transportation . 
In places where precursor and essential 
chemicals are manufactured, sold, trans-
ported, or taken across international 
boundaries, law enforcement otficcrs also 
should be aware of the laws and regula-
tions aimed at preventing diversion of 
these substances to illegal use. 
The DC AG stressed that training must 
reach all areas or the law t~nrorcemenl 
system since mral rolice agencies arc just 
as likely to encounter clandestine labs as 
urban police. Srecial training may be 
necessary for highway patrols, as well as 
other agencies in jurisdictions that have 
large railroad and other transportation 
hubs. 
Environmental and occupational issues. 
In addition, the DCAG noted the need for 
law enforcement agencies to be aware of 
environmental and occupational laws and 
regulations associated with the seizure of 
clandestine labs. 
Because of the toxicity of the chemicals, a 
law enforcement agency becomes liable 
for various cleanup and transporting opera-
tions, for any damage to natural resource~, 
and for subsequent health risks that remam 
after the lab is dismantled. These require-
ments result from provisions of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Ad and the 
8 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
Also, the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act makes owners of 
contaminated property responsible for 
decontamination before it is sold.9 Thus, if 
a property is confiscated by a loc~l juris-
diction, seized through asset forfetture 
laws, and subsequently sold, the jurisdic-
tion may still be responsible for cleanup. 
The DCAG also discussed the fact that law 
enforcement agencies are required by 
Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration regulations 10 to provide medical 
monitoring, appropriate safety equipment, 
and training for employees who work with 
toxic substances. Jurisdictions must pro-
vide these services to police personnel who 
raid toxic clandestine lab sites, according 
to these regulations. 
Additional legislation. The enactment of 
Federal legislation has improved our effec-
tiveness in controlling the international 
movement of these substances. However, 
several DCAG members called for more 
potency in the Federal statutes. The DCAG 
suggested that legislation be strengthened 
by requiring licenses or permits for manu-
facturers of precursor and essential chemi-
cals. In addition, longer waiting periods 
before shipment could increase the level of 
confidence that purchasers are legitimate 
users, and more followup and record-
keeping could also ensure that sub~tances 
are used for legitimate purposes. Fmally, 
some group members sought to extend 
controls to chemical analogs and other 
substitutes for currently controlled precur-
sor and essential substances. 
The lack of legislation requiring record-
keeping in 33 States has cause~ pro?lems 
in domestic efforts to control dtverston. 
Without adequate recordkeeping require-
ments, there are no paper trails of diverted 
chemicals. Criminals can camouflage 
diversion by shuffling shipments through 
States lacking controls. 
Furthermore, even those States that have 
legislation sometimes are inconsistent in 
their regulatory requirements. Many 
DCAG members called for more States to 
adopt model legislation such as that devel-
oped by the American Prosecut?rs ~e- . 
search Institute. This modellegtslatton ts 
integrated with Federal laws and would 
add to the effectiveness of the system of 
controls that has already proved effective 
in reducing illicit international trade. 
Adoption of this model legislation by all 
States, the DCAG suggested, could pro-
vide the same sort of control for interstate 
diversion. 
According to the DCAG, State legislation 
on chemical diversion and trafficking 
should include all federally listed sub-
stances and contain a clause that permits 
rapid inclusion of new substances to the 
Federal list without the need for a separate 
review process. The DCAG also suggt<sted 
that State laws include requirements for 
recordkeeping and reporting, with all 
records to be preserved for at least 4 years. 
Members also saw a need for the legisla-
tion to provide assurances for keeping 
sensitive business information confidential, 
provide for subpoena power to obtain 
access to records, and make forfeitures and 
other penalties consistent with Federal 
legislation. 
Information systems. The complex sys-
tems of diversion developed by criminal 
drug producers make it essential that law 
enforcement agencies work together to 
control this problem. The necessity for 
investigators to follow circuitous ship~e?t 
routes, as well as the ever-present posstbtl-
ity that fraudulent documents will be used 
in diversion, make it essential that law 
enforcement agencies have access to up-to-
date, accurate information about amounts 
being shipped, legitimate users, and lost or 
stolen materials. The DCAG noted that a 
nationwide information system, accessible 
by Federal, State, and local agenci~s, 
would help greatly in both preventmg and 
investigating diversion. This system also 
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could be tied into an international system 
to help track imports and exports of these 
substances. 
The group also saw a need for creatin~ a 
uniform reporting method on clandestme 
lab statistics. Data on clandestine lab 
activities and the amounts of chemicals 
seized would give a better indication of the 
extent of these enforcement activities and 
their importance in halting the drug trade. 
Chemical Action Task Force 
recommendations 
The international Chemical Action Task 
Force met several times from 1990 to 1992 
and created three working groups: Chemi-
cal Issues, Diversion Issues, and Legal 
and Regulatory Issues. Each working 
group gathered and analyzed information 
from the experiences of CA TF member 
countries and the knowledge of expert 
participants. Each group then made recom-
mendations to the entire task force. The 
reports of these groups, published in 
1991, 11 are summarized below. 
Chemical Issues Working Group. This 
working group identified the specific 
chemicals that should be regulated interna-
tionally. It examined chemicals used in the 
manufacture of illicit drugs, including 
heroin, cocaine, stimulant amphetamines, 
LSD, PCP, methamphetamine, and 
methaqualone. The working group recom-
mended 10 additional substances for con-
trol and these have already been approved 
for lnclusion in the 1988 U.N. convention. 
Exhibit 2 is a list of precursor and essential 
chemicals controlled by the U.N. conven-
tion, suggested by the CATF, and currently 
controlled by the United States. 
Diversion Issues Working Group. The 
second group examined existing methods 
for diverting chemicals and, in light of 
existing business practices and domestic 
and international laws and regulations, 
sought appropriate ways to prevent diver-
sion. This group surveyed member coun-
tries to determine their greatest problems 
and concerns about diversion. Based on 
this survey, the group prepared a compre-
hensive list of diversion methods. (See 
exhibit 1.) 
Legal and Regulatory Issues Working 
Group. The third group focused on le~~l 
and regulatory issues. It surveyed partici-
Exhibit 2. Precursor and Essential Chemicals Identified by CATF 
Acetic anhydride* 
Acetone* 
N-Acetylanthranilic acid* 
Ammonia (anhydrous) 
Ammonia in aqueous solution 
Ammonium hydroxide 
Anthranilic acid* 
Benzene 
Benzyl chloride* 
Benzyl cyanide* 
2-Butanone (MEK)* 
Butyl acetate 
Butyl alcohol 
Calcium carbonate 
Calcium hydroxide 
Chloroform (Trichloromethane) 
Diacetone alcohol (pyranton) 
Ephedrine* 
Ergometrine (Ergonovine)* 
Ergotamine* 
Ethyl acetate 
Ethylamine* 
N-Ethylephedrine* 
Ethyl ether* 
N-Ethylpseudoephedrine* 
Hexane 
Hydriotic acid* 
pating nations to determine their existing 
laws and regulations on these substances. 
The group also used the findings of the 
first two groups as the basis for its recom-
mendations. These recommendations are 
directed toward all countries involved in 
the legal manufacture, sale, distribution , 
transit, or use of essential and precursor 
chemicals. 
The working group recommended that the 
manufacture, sale, and distribution of 
chemical products with the aim of manu-
facturing narcotics and other illicit drugs 
should constitute a violation of narcotics 
legislation and should be prosecuted in the 
same manner as drug trafficking. The 
Hydrochloric acid* 
lsosafrole* 
Lysergic acid* 
Methyl alcohol 
Methylamine* 
3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone* 
N-Methylephedrine* 
N-Methylpseudoephedrine* 
Norpseudoephedrine • 
Petroleum ether (petroleum benzene) 
Phenylacetic acid* 
Phenylpropanolamine* 
1-Phenyl-2-propanone (phenylacetone) 
Piperidine* 
Piperonal* 
Potassium permanganate* 
Propionic anhydride* 
Pseudoephedrine* 
Safrole* 
Sodium bicarbonate 
Sodium carbonate 
Sodium hydroxide 
Sulfuric acid* 
Toluene* 
Xylenes (Xyloles) 
*Regulated by the United States 
group further recommended that all coun-
tries ratify the U.N. convention, but stated 
that no proposal to reform the U.N. con-
vention or annex should hinder a country 
from improving its systems to control these 
substances. 
The group stressed that new regulations 
should consider the need to preserve licit 
commerce and avoid making a control 
system so burdensome that it hinders com-
merce. Finally, the working group empha-
sized that international cooperation is 
indispensable. All parties must satisfy 
themselves about the legality and regular-
ity of every shipment of precursor ores-
sential chemicals. 
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General recommendations. Building 
upon the findings and recommendations of 
its working groups, the CATF adopted a 
final report in June 1991 that made general 
recommendations about the control and 
regulation of these substances. It suggested 
that all affected countries develop control 
programs with five key components: 
• Vigilance. All commercial operators 
who deal with essential and precursor 
chemicals must remain alert for efforts to 
divert these substances for illicit purposes. 
• Administrative surveillance. Accurate 
records must be kept of all production and 
transactions. These must be retained for a 
minimum of 2 years. [The United States 
already requires that records of transac-
tions involving precursor chemicals be 
kept for 4 years and that records of transac-
tions involving essential chemicals be kept 
for 2 years.] 
• Registration and authorization. 
Manufacturers of certain substances, par-
ticularly precursors, should be licensed to 
make and sell them. This component is not 
necessary for essential chemicals such as 
acetone and ethyl ether that have wide in-
dustrial applications. 
• Export authorization. Every country 
should control its exports of these materi-
als to prevent them from falling into the 
hands of illicit enterprises. 
• Import authorization. Every country 
also should be certain that imports of the 
substances are not diverted to illicit drug 
producers. 
The task force made other recommenda-
tions about how to control this problem. It 
called for greater U.N. funding for the In-
ternational Narcotics Control Board and 
suggested that the board give priority to 
providing resources for communications, 
equipment, and training. The task force 
also called for governments to monitor 
commerce to identify new substances used 
in illicit drug production, as well as new 
methods and patterns of diversion. It urged 
countries involved in the production, tran-
sit, transshipment, and use of precursor and 
essential chemicals to share information on 
legitimate and illegitimate users. It also 
suggested that all countries provide assist-
ance in international law enforcement 
efforts. 
The task force urged that each country de-
velop regulatory measures for every stage 
of the distribution process (receipt, storage, 
handling, processing, and delivery) of the 
subject chemicals, particularly in free ports 
and free trade zones. Finally, it suggested 
that discrete international tariff codes be 
developed to track each of the chemicals 
more effectively. 
Summary 
If we are to control and defeat the drug 
problem, our Nation's law enforcement 
agencies must learn more about precursor 
and essential chemicals and the role they 
play in drug trafficking. Also, every juris-
diction must review and make certain that 
its laws and policies meet the objective of 
controlling the flow of these chemicals. 
The regulation of precursor and essential 
chemicals is a crucial component of efforts 
to reduce the supply of illicit drugs. But it 
is not just a national endeavor. The activi-
ties of the Chemical Action Task Force 
and other international bodies demonstrate 
the worldwide scope of this effort. Further-
more, State and local law enforcement 
officials have an important role in making 
certain that their jurisdictions do not unwit-
tingly become a source of chemicals for 
clandestine laboratories or a haven for 
manufacturers of illegal drugs. 
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